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Schweitzer: Justice Scalia

JUSTICE SCALIA, ORIGINALISM AND TEXTUALISM
Thomas A. Schweitzer *
INTRODUCTION
The inimitable Justice Antonin Scalia, who served nearly
thirty years on the Supreme Court, 1 was one of the most
consequential justices in recent history. More than any other justice,
he frequently interrupted attorneys arguing before the Court, and the
other justices, except for his close ally Clarence Thomas, tended to
follow suit. He changed the character of Court rhetoric with his
colorful language and unsparing ridicule of opinions he disagreed
with. 2 The number of his humorous remarks which provoked laughter
during Supreme Court arguments consistently exceeded his
colleagues’ numbers. His willingness to voice controversial views—
he once stated that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not protect females against discrimination 3—makes
*

Professor of Law. Touro Law Center. J.D. Yale Law School; Ph.D., University of
Wisconsin.
1 Biography of Former Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographyScalia.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2017).
2 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting), in which
the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment required states to license marriages between
people of the same sex; he stated: “The opinion is couched in a style that is as pretentious as
its content is egotistic . . . . Of course the opinion’s showy profundities are often profoundly
incoherent.” Numerous similar examples of Scalia’s sarcasm and ridicule of his colleagues’
opinions are quoted by eminent Constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky, who while
acknowledging Scalia’s “great intellect” and superb writing rebukes him for setting a bad
example for law students. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A
Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 386, 399-401 (2000).
3 Allen Rostron, Justice Scalia’s Truthiness and the Virtues of Judicial Candor, 89 IND.
L.J. SUPP. 12, 14-15 (2013). According to Rostron, Scalia was questioned while testifying
before the Senate Judiciary Committee “about a magazine interview in which he had said
that the Fourteenth Amendment should not be construed to prohibit sex discrimination
because that was not its original meaning or intent.” Id. at 14. Of course, his good friend on
the Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, had made a legal career advancing the recognition
of women’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause in cases that she had argued before the
Court.
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it surprising to recall that the 1986 Senate vote to confirm him was
unanimous. 4
For the first half of his tenure on the Supreme Court, which
was before President George H. W. Bush’s appointment of both
Chief Justice John Roberts in 2005 and Justice Samuel Alito in 2006
(which would eventually cement a conservative majority on the
Court), Scalia was often in the minority. 5 From that time until his
death in February 2016, he was a reliable member of the conservative
majority with Justice Alito and Justice Clarence Thomas, usually
joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts.6
During that period, his consistent and sustained conservative
leadership led The New York Times to suggest that the Supreme Court
during this time should be called “the Scalia Court.” 7
The most important mark Justice Scalia left on the Supreme
Court may have been his advocacy of the jurisprudential doctrines of
textualism and originalism, which won wide acceptance on the Court,
even among his ideological rivals. Justice Elena Kagan once
remarked, “We’re all textualists now.” 8 As Dean of Harvard Law
School before she was appointed to the Supreme Court by President
Obama, Ms. Kagan had said of Justice Scalia:
His views on textualism and originalism, his views on
the role of judges in our society, on the practice of
judging, have really transformed the legal debate in
this country. He is the justice who has had the most
important impact over the years on how we think and
talk about the law. 9
If the meaning of a constitutional provision or statutory
section was in question, Scalia held that a court should focus on the
4 JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL – THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 121 (2009).
5 Jan Crawford Greenburg, Bush Legacy: The Supreme Court, ABC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/BushLegacy/story?id=6597342.
6 Jeremy Bowers et al., Which Supreme Court Justices Vote Together Most and Least
Often, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/24/upshot/24up-scotusagreement -rates.html (last updated July 3, 2014).
7 The Editorial Board, Justice Antonin Scalia’s Supreme Court Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/opinion/justice-antonin-scalias-supremecourt-legacy.html?_r=0.
8 KEVIN A. RING, SCALIA’S COURT: A LEGACY OF LANDMARK OPINIONS AND DISSENTS 542
(2016).
9 Id. at 19.
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text.10 He stated that the textualist should “look[ ] for meaning in the
governing text, ascribe[ ] to that text the meaning that it has borne
from its inception, and reject[ ] judicial speculation about both the
drafters’ extratextually derived purposes and the desirability of the
fair reading’s anticipated consequences.” 11 Thus, if someone claimed
that he or she were being denied the exercise of a right, or the
government were asserting the authority to take a certain action, a
court should apply the text’s plain meaning without reference to
legislative history, so long as the text’s plain meaning was
unambiguous. 12 Moreover, Scalia believed that if the meaning of a
statute were plain, a court was bound to apply that literal meaning,
even if the Court was convinced that the literal meaning clearly
conflicted with the intent of those who enacted it. 13
Of course, the meaning of words can evolve and change over
time. A corollary of textualism is originalism, the principle that a
legal text means what it was understood to mean at the time it was
enacted, 14 and not a new meaning that may shift radically over time.
Thus, the meaning of a law depends on its text, and that meaning is
fixed in time.15
I.

TEXTUALISM VS. LEGISLATIVE INTENT: THE COURT
UPHOLDS “OBAMACARE”

No doubt the most important recent controversy over the
theory of textualism involved the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the ACA or
“Obamacare”). 16 Congress passed the law in 2010 without a single

10

Id. at 1.
Enrique Schaerer, What the Heller?: An Originalist Critique of Justice Scalia’s Second
Amendment Jurisprudence, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 795, 796 (2014).
12 RING, supra note 8, at 22-23.
13 RING, supra note 8, at 22-23.
14 RING, supra note 8, at 22-23.
15 Originalism has not lacked for scholarly critics who oppose it. See, e.g., FRANK B.
CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 5 (2013); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is
Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (2009); Morgan Cloud, A Conclusion in Search of a
History to Support it, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 29, 33-34 (2010).
16 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2481-82 (2015) (dashing conservative hopes when
conservative Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy voted to uphold the statute
over a bitter dissent by Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel
Alito).
11
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Republican vote, 17 which led to a dramatic conflict on the Court
between proponents of Scalia’s textualism and their jurisprudential
rivals, whose approach would justify departing from the literal
meaning of a text when following such meaning would subvert the
statute’s entire purpose. 18
The ACA, which achieved quasi-universal national medical
insurance, 19 constituted the largest expansion of the welfare state
since the FDR Administration and was also the most significant
legislative achievement of the Obama presidency. It substantially
accomplished for the first time a goal that had eluded every
Democratic president since Harry Truman, but also provoked the
bitter and implacable opposition by Congressional Republicans, who
voted in the House of Representatives to repeal it more than fifty
times. 20 Opposition to the ACA was obviously a major cause of the
disastrous decline of Democratic strength in both houses of Congress
beginning with the 2010 elections, although Republican numbers
remained below the two-thirds needed to override an Obama veto. 21
The ACA established a system of tax credit incentives and
corresponding penalties to encourage people to sign up for medical
insurance exchanges. 22 States that agreed with the ACA could set up
their own exchanges to qualify for the tax credits. 23 However, many
predominantly conservative states refused to establish their own
exchanges, so the statute authorized the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to establish federal exchanges in those states.24
Because of an apparent drafting oversight, however, the vital tax
17 Id. at 2506: Shailagh Murray & Lori Montgomery, House Passes Health-Care
Reform Bill Without Republican Votes, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 1010), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/21/AR2010032100943.html.
18 Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012),
https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism
[hereinafter Incoherence of Antonin Scalia].
19 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, 124 Stat 119 (2010);
Sara Rosenbaum, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Implications for Public
Health Policy and Practice, NCBI: PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS (Jan-Feb. 2011),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pmc/articles/PMC3001814/.
20 Ed O’Keefe, The House Has Voted 54 Times in Four Years on Obamacare. Here’s the
Full List, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2014/03/21/the-house-has-voted-54-times-in-four-years-on-obamacare-heres-the-fulllist/?utm_term=.cf7eba84d658.
21 U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 3.
22 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2016); 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(j) (2016).
23 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-93(b)(1) (2010).
24 42 U.S.C. § 18041(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II) (2010).
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credit provision was limited by the statute to “an [e]xchange
established by the State,” 25 and a literal construction of these terms
obviously excluded federally-established exchanges. The U.S.
Treasury regulation issued under the ACA, however, made federal
exchanges eligible for the tax benefits, 26 since otherwise far fewer
people would be covered by the new law. 27 Opponents of the ACA
challenged the regulation in court, arguing that the statute clearly
limited tax credits and benefits to state exchanges and that by
extending these benefits to exchanges established by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, the agency had exceeded the authority
Congress had granted it. 28
The plaintiffs in King v. Burwell and other adversaries of
Obamacare felt confident of victory when the case was argued in the
Supreme Court. 29 However, they received a rude surprise when the
Supreme Court upheld the ACA and the challenged regulation in
June 2015. 30 Conservative Chief Justice Roberts, perhaps influenced
by the harsh criticism that would inevitably result if the Court he
headed issued a decision which crippled the president’s major
legislative accomplishment, wrote an opinion upholding the statute
and regulation on the grounds that the statutory language was
ambiguous, and treated it as a tax. 31 Since this conformed to
Congress’s intent, he concluded that the phrase “established by the

25

26 U.S.C. § 36B (2016).
45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2017).
27 Timothy S. Jost, Subsidies and the Survival of the ACA – Divided Decisions on
Premium Tax Credits, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890, 890-91 (2014) (explaining that
enforcement of the narrow literal construction of the statutory language would have drastic
results); Linda J. Blumberg et al., The Implications of a Supreme Court Finding for the
Plaintiff in King vs. Burwell: 8.2 Million More Uninsured and 35% Higher Premiums, URB.
INST. (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.urban.org/research/publication/implications-supreme-courtfinding-plaintiff-king
-vs-burwell-82-million-more-uninsured-and-35-higher-premiums
(estimating that a victory for the plaintiff would increase the number of uninsured by 8.2
million people).
28 King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 415, 427-28 (E.D.Va. 2014).
29 Robert Pear, Top Plaintiff in Health Subsidies Case Awaits Edict Unperturbed, N.Y.
TIMES (Jun. 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/us/david-king-obamacaresupreme-court.html.
30 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496.
31 Id. at 2495-96.
26
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State” should be interpreted to mean “established by the state or the
federal Department of Health and Human Services” (“HHS”). 32
Scalia dissented angrily, insisting that the phrase “by the
State” could not plausibly be read to mean “established by the State
or the Federal Government.” 33 He protested: “[t]hat is of course quite
absurd, and the Court’s 21 pages of explanation make it no less so.” 34
While acknowledging that the context of a statute matters, he
remonstrated, “[l]et us not forget, however, why context matters: It is
a tool for understanding the terms of the law, not an excuse for
rewriting them.” 35 Rather than attempt to rescue the legislative
branch from the effects of its careless draftsmanship, he insisted that
courts should apply the presumption that lawmakers use words in
“their natural and ordinary signification,” 36 and should not alter that
meaning in order to uphold Congress’s enactment.
II.

SCALIA’S PRACTICE OF TEXTUALISM AND ORIGINALISM

If the meaning of a text were ambiguous, Scalia believed that
a court “should look for support for the claimed right or authority in
the legal and social traditions of the United States.” 37 If a
government’s exercise of authority “had been accepted by law or
custom [throughout United States history,] it should stand,” and an
asserted right of individual liberty should fail if it “had been
restricted or eliminated by the states throughout history.” 38 A
remarkable application of this principle was Scalia’s citation of a
Fifteenth-Century English decision 39 in rejecting an argument that the
capias ad respondendum, by which a person served with process
inside the jurisdiction could be forcibly detained and required to
appear in court to defend a lawsuit, violated due process. 40 For
32

Id. at 2485, 2487, 2491. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan concurred in
Roberts’s opinion for the majority, joined somewhat surprisingly by Justice Kennedy. Id. at
2484.
33 Id. at 2497 (Scalia J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
34 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 2497 (Scalia J., dissenting).
36 Id. (Scalia J., dissenting) (citing Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 12
(1878)).
37 RING, supra note 8, at 2.
38 RING, supra note 8, at 2.
39 Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., Cty. of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 608 (1990) (citing
Bowser v. Collins, Y.B. Mich. 22 Edw. IV, f. 30, pl. 11, 145 Eng. Rep. 97 (Ex. Ch.1482)).
40 Id. at 608, 618.
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Scalia, five centuries of accepted legal practice precluded a valid
claim of violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 41
Another requirement of Scalia's originalism is that a judge
should identify the meaning of a statute or constitutional provision
by trying to ascertain what it meant to those who voted to adopt it.42
While words’ meanings sometimes change over the centuries, “the
originalist at least knows what he is looking for: the original meaning
of the text.” 43 Thus, originalism is “the polar opposite of living
constitutionalism,” whose proponents believe that the text’s meaning
must be evaluated in the light of changing historical conditions and
“the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society. . . .” 44 Justice Scalia emphatically opposed this
approach; if the meaning of a statute or constitutional provision’s
wording were clear and unambiguous, he believed that judges should
apply its original meaning unaffected by later developments. 45 An
essential feature of both textualism and originalism is that they reject
the attempt to rely on the legislators’ intent in interpreting a statute’s
meaning, especially if that intent differs from the text’s plain
meaning.
Textualists and originalists also reject recourse to legislative
history to elucidate a text’s meaning. 46 This is because legislators
vote for or against statutes for a wide range of possible reasons, and
41 See id. at 608 (holding that service on the defendant in the forum was sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction, and this obviated the need of minimum contacts with the
forum) (citation omitted); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(holding that due process was satisfied if there were sufficient “minimum contacts” between
the out-of-state defendant and the forum); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-36 (1877)
(holding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected the rights of a
domiciliary of one state who was sued in another state).
42 RING, supra note 8, at 16, 22
43 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION - FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 45
(1997). Scalia of course acknowledged that ascertaining the original meaning of a legal text
was sometimes difficult, and that originalists could disagree on their conclusions. Id.
44 Trop v. Dulles, 356 US. 86, 101 (1958) (holding that stripping a deserter of U.S.
citizenship was an unconstitutional penaty); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION
11 (2010).
45 David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia’s Fidelity
to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L. J. 1377, 1378, 1382 (1999) (explaining that
Scalia famously stated that he liked his Constitution “dead,” i.e., that it should have a fixed
and enduring meaning, which would not change from age to age to reflect the evolving
values of the American people).
46 See RING, supra note 8, at 16 (“[Scalia] railed against the practice of using legislative
history – the statements on the floor of the House or Senate by the bill’s sponsors or
committee reports drafted by staff, for example—to interpret a law’s text.”).
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“there is no singular intent that can be attributed to the body passing
the law.” 47 Even if such intent could be determined, however, it is
not a legitimate source of meaning, since “[w]e are governed by laws,
not by the intentions of legislators.” 48 And where the text of a statute
is clear, it is improper to seek support for a court’s holding in the
words of a Senate Committee Report, which might not reflect the
views of the full committee, the Senate, the House, or the president
who signed the bill. 49 Recourse to legislative history to determine the
meaning of legal texts had become more and more common in the
Supreme Court during the Twentieth Century, 50 but Justice Scalia’s
espousal of textualism helped counter this trend. 51 Scholars noted
that reliance on congressional committee reports and similar sources
in order to identify the meaning of a legal or constitutional text
diminished during Scalia’s tenure, at least among conservative
justices. 52
Textualist judges also oppose the recognition of “fundamental
rights” which are not enumerated in the Constitution, such as the
right of privacy53 or the right to obtain an abortion, 54 which is why
Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork 55 and Chief Justice Rehnquist56
47

RING, supra note 8, at 16.
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
49 See RING, supra note 8, at 16-17 (citing Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 542
U.S. 241, 267 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (showing how Scalia urged
judges to search for its “original meaning” instead of seeking the intent of a law).
50 Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative
Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 294, 297-98, 302-03 (1982); but see
Jeffrey S. Sutton, The Role of History in Judging Disputes About the Meaning of the
Constitution, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1173, 1175-76, 1192 (2009) (finding that use of
historical analysis in constitutional cases (which is quite different from legislative history
and typifies the originalist approach) increased from seven percent to thirty-five percent
between 1987 and 2007).
51 Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The
Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. LEGIS. 369, 379-80 (1999).
52 This trend reversed itself somewhat after Judge Stephen Breyer was appointed to the
Court in 1994. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1991) (endorsing the use of committee reports as the best
evidence of Congress’s institutional intent).
53 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508-10 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
54 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172, 177 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
55 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
166 (1990) (“[A] judge, no matter on what court he sits, may never create new constitutional
rights or destroy old ones. Any time he does so, he violates not only the limits to his own
authority but, and for that reason, also violates the rights of the legislature and the people.”).
56 Roe, 410 U.S. at 221-22 (White, J., dissenting) (“I find nothing in the language or
history of the Constitution to support the Court’s judgment. The Court simply fashions and
48
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criticized previous Warren Court decisions as unmoored to the text of
the Constitution. But it was probably Justice Scalia who was the
most influential exemplar of this approach, and the consistency of his
jurisprudence with conservative political views helped advance the
fifty-year project of Republican presidents to move the Supreme
Court to the right.
In his 1997 book A Matter of Interpretation, Scalia described
the “Great Divide” in constitutional interpretation between “original
meaning” (for instance, how the meaning of the Bill of Rights was
understood by those who ratified it) and “current meaning” (how it is
differently understood nowadays). 57 He, of course, opposed the
latter. As examples of current meaning, former Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun and current Justice Breyer all concluded that
capital punishment was abhorrent by modern standards and thus,
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. 58 In contrast, for Scalia, because capital punishment
was universally accepted in 1791 (when the Bill of Rights was
adopted), capital punishment could not be considered “cruel and
unusual punishment.” 59
Similarly, in keeping with their implicit belief in a living
Constitution, Justices Anthony Kennedy and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in
opinions restricting capital punishment for mentally challenged
defendants 60 and youthful offenders, 61 gave positive weight to
evolving standards of decency in a maturing society. 62 In contrast,

announces a new constitutional right for pregnant women . . . with scarcely any reason or
authority for its action . . . . As an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has
authority to do what it does today; but in my view its judgment is an improvident and
extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this
Court.”).
57 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 82
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (emphasis omitted).
58 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 305, 321 (2002).
59 See, e.g., Atkins, 535 U.S. at 311, 337-40 (2002) (Scalia, dissenting).
60 Id. at 311-12, 319-20.
61 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554-56, 570-71, 578-79 (2005) (noting that
Christopher Simmons was seventeen years old when he committed a horrible murder. In a
5-4 decision authored by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court
holding that capital punishment was cruel and unusual when applied to a juvenile offender.).
62 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. In 1972, the Supreme Court effectively
suspended the death penalty because its arbitrary imposition violated due process. Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 285-86 (1972). It was later made available again after the Court’s
decision in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 351-52 (1981).
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Justice Scalia’s preferred Constitution was “dead,” and its meaning
could not evolve together with historical changes and changing
cultural and moral values. 63 In addition, Scalia rejected outright any
relevance of foreign legal doctrines to American jurisprudence,
unlike Kennedy and Ginsburg, who cited them with respect in cases
involving American constitutional issues. 64
Another instance in which Scalia refused to follow the Court
in taking a “living Constitution” approach involved gay rights and
same-sex marriage. 65 Justice Kennedy, ordinarily a member of the
conservative wing of the court, proudly diverged from it in a series of
cases expanding the rights of homosexuals. 66 The Court struck down
laws against sodomy. 67 It invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act.68
Most significantly, in 2015 it struck down state laws barring marriage
between persons of the same gender as violations of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 69
The Obergefell decision marked a remarkable shift towards
acceptance of same-sex marriage (at least by courts) which would
have seemed implausible twenty years earlier. Justice Scalia joined
Chief Justice Robert’s dissent in full, but he wrote separately to “call
attention to this Court’s threat to American democracy” 70 when the
unelected nine justices invaded the area of marriage law, which had
traditionally been entrusted to the states. Predictably, the originalist
Scalia ridiculed the five-vote majority for holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment included a protection for same-sex marriage and further
argued that the Framers could not have intended this when the
Amendment was ratified in 1868. 71
63

RING, supra note 8, at 7-8.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 574-75, 622-23.
65 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586, 593-94 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); U.S v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2697-98, 2707 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Obergefell, 135 S.
Ct. at 2626-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 578; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682; Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at
2593, 2608.
67 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
68 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
69 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608; but see Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]o allow the policy question of same-sex marriage to be considered and
resolved by a select, patrician, highly unrepresentative panel of nine is to violate a principle
even more fundamental than no taxation without representation: no social transformation
without representation.”).
70 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71 See id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But what really astounds is the hubris reflected
in today’s judicial Putsch. The five Justices who compose today’s majority are entirely
64
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Scalia did not claim that taking an originalist approach to
legal texts was always simple. On the contrary, he believed that it
necessitated sustained, in-depth studies of the relevant legal texts and
sources. 72 Moreover, while the general outlines of originalism may
be clear, there is no firm consensus among originalists as to what
texts are authoritatively original. 73 Scalia’s originalism clearly
accepted the bedrock of common law as valid. 74 Moreover, while he
had doubts about the original validity of the incorporation doctrine, 75

comfortable concluding that every State violated the Constitution for all of the l35 years
between the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification and Massachusetts’ permitting of samesex marriages in 2003. They have discovered in the Fourteenth Amendment a ‘fundamental
right’ overlooked by every person alive at the time of ratification, and almost everyone else
in the time since.”) (footnote omitted). Interestingly, Edward L. Rubin leveled a similar
charge against Scalia himself when he charged Scalia with an egregious departure from
longstanding understanding of another Constitutional provision, the Second Amendment.
Edward L. Rubin, Question Regarding D.C. v. Heller: As a Justice, Antonin Scalia is (A)
Great, (B) Acceptable, (C) Injudicious, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1105, 1113-14 (2008) (accusing
Scalia of a “startling” reinterpretation of an ancient text, the Second Amendment: “Heller
represents the first time that the Supreme Court has struck down a statute on Second
Amendment grounds in the entire history of the Republic. Justice Scalia has apparently
discovered the true meaning of a provision that other judges have been reading and
interpreting differently for two hundred years.”). Rubin further charged that the Heller
opinion “has no purpose beyond political partisanship.” Id. at 1117.
72 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856-57 (1989)
(conceding in his view that “[i]ts greatest defect, in my view, is the difficulty of applying it
correctly . . . . [I]t is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding of an
ancient text. Properly done, the task requires the consideration of an enormous mass of
material – in the case of the Constitution and its Amendments, for example, to mention only
one element, the records of the ratifying debates in all the states.”).
73 Id. at 856.
74 Id. at 864-65. This is not self-evident with respect to Constitutional provisions,
according to Erwin Chemerinsky. Commenting on the “original meaning” of such
provisions, he notes that “the search for original meaning in contemporaneous practices
assumes that the Constitution sought to codify those particular behaviors” but contends,
“[y]et, there is no basis for this assumption. Even if a particular practice was universal at the
time the constitutional provision was drafted and ratified, that still does not establish that the
Constitution was meant to enshrine that behavior….” Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 285, 395 (2000).
75 This is the accepted doctrine that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause
makes important parts of the Bill of Rights, such as the First Amendment, binding against
state governments. See. e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Gitlow v. N.Y., 268
U.S. 652 (1925); Dave Benner, The 14th Amendment and the Incorporation Doctrine,
DAVE BENNER (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.davebenner.com/the-14th-amendment-and-theincorporation-doctrine/.
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he accepted this as a fait accompli enshrined in decades of legal
precedent. 76
Controversy has also swirled for decades over whether Brown
v. Board of Education, 77 perhaps the greatest landmark of Twentieth
Century jurisprudence, is consistent with originalist principles.
Scalia believed that Brown was a valid originalist decision from the
outset. 78 In support, he cited the dissent by the first Justice Harlan in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 79 which he claimed was “thoroughly
originalist.” 80 However, while Brown has been firmly rooted in our
constitutional firmament for decades, it is easy to forget that when it
was decided, prominent law professor Herbert Wechsler questioned
the Court’s use of sociological evidence to support its holding. 81
Ronald Turner stated that he regards the Brown decision as
“nonoriginalist, if not anti-originalist,” 82 and he rejected Scalia’s
reliance on the views of Justice Harlan because Harlan, despite his
dissent in Plessy, “believed in racial hierarchy, endorsed white
supremacy and rejected the idea that African Americans were the

76 Antonin Scalia and the Incorporation Doctrine, TENTH AMEND. CTR., http://
tenthamendmentcenter.com/2017/01/15/antonin-scalia-and-the-incorporation-doctrine/ (last
visited Apr. 30, 2017).
77 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78 Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 95 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“In my view the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of ‘equal protection of the laws’,
combined with the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of the institution of black slavery,
leaves no room for doubt that laws treating people differently because of their race are
invalid.”). However, the same Congress that approved the Fourteenth Amendment also voted
to segregate the District of Columbia public schools. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE
360 (1986). This was only held unconstitutional in Brown’s companion case, Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
79 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
80 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); Ronald Turner, A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia’s
Originalist Defense of Brown v. Board of Education, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE. 170,
182-83 (2014).
81 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 33 (1959) (arguing that Brown is inconsistent with the demands of principled
adjudication). While he was a Harvard Law School student, Scalia was evidently strongly
influenced by a speech of Columbia Professor Wechsler in Cambridge in 1959, in which
Wechsler recommended that lawyers prevent the Supreme Court from becoming a “naked
power organ” by conducting a “sustained, disinterested, merciless examination” of litigants’
arguments. Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin
Scalia. THE NEW YORKER, (Mar. 28, 2005).
82 Turner, supra note 80, at 173.
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social equals of whites.” 83 The conclusion seems plain that the
Brown decision is hard to square with originalism. 84
Another legal principle that Scalia claimed was originalist,
but others challenged, was that flag burning was protected by the
First Amendment. 85 Evidently, there was no tradition of burning
cloth to exercise one’s freedom of expression in 1791.86
Nevertheless, Scalia concurred in the controversial decision striking
down laws against flag burning as unconstitutional. 87
In any event, while the broad outlines of originalism seem
fairly clear, opinions differ on its details. In a recent survey of
originalist jurisprudence, Chicago Professor William Baude, who
subscribes to “inclusive originalism”, describes some of the varying
approaches of self-proclaimed originalists. 88 Many but not all
originalists accept the persuasive authority of precedent that
characterized common law for centuries before the American
Revolution and the Constitution.89 The originalism of original
meaning appears to have prevailed over the originalism of original
intent, and Justice Scalia heartily approved of this. 90 But with respect
to provisions of the Constitution, his originalist approach assumed the
validity of the common law background of particular constitutional
questions, while other originalists disagreed. 91 Scalia also regarded

83

Turner, supra note 80, at 173.
However, a contemporary commentator has argued that Brown stems from valid
constitutional law, even though the decision did not follow an originalist approach. Pamela
S. Karlan, What Can Brown Do for You? – Neutral Principles and the Struggle over the
Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L. J. 1049, 1054 (2009).
85 Robert A. Stein, A Consequential Justice, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 8 (2016).
86 Timeline of Flag Desecration Issues, BETSY ROSS AND THE AMERICAN FLAG,
http://www.ushistory.org/betsy/more/desecration.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2017).
87 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989). Professor Laurence H. Tribe comments that “surely the extension of ‘freedom of
speech’ to encompass flag burning or cross burning . . . would—to a Scalia originalist—
entail a most ambitious exercise in attributing modern ideas of the free speech principle to
our predecessors.” SCALIA, supra note 57, at 83.
88 William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2363 (2015).
89 Id. at 2358-59. Another non-constitutional rule which originalists favor is the doctrine
of waiver: if there was legal authority favorable to the case of a litigant who did not argue it,
a court would ordinarily not address it and instead would deem it waived. Id. at 2359-60.
90 Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U.
CIN. L. REV. 7, 9 (2006).
91 Id. at 9, 12.
84
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court decisions interpreting and applying constitutional provisions as
valid, unlike some other originalists. 92
When the meanings of words used in law evolve and change
over time, it can be argued that applying their evolving meaning to
new cases is required in order to be faithful to their original sense. A
related issue regarding District of Columbia v. Heller is whether
originalists should evaluate the permissibility of gun control
regulations which apply to contemporary firearms by the same
standards which made sense for the much more primitive and less
lethal muskets of the late 1700s. 93 Some originalists adhere to
unoriginalist precedents. These approaches are typical of inclusive
originalism, 94 whereas they might be rejected by exclusive
originalists. 95 In addition, the most ardent originalists do not question
the validity of subsequent constitutional amendments that overrule
prior constitutional court decisions. 96
III.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER

One of the Roberts Court’s greatest constitutional law
innovations is District of Columbia v. Heller, 97 a 2008 Second
Amendment decision by Chief Justice Roberts in which the Court
held for the first time in history that the right to bear arms was a
fundamental Second Amendment right, subjecting any governmental

92 Id. at 12-13 (asserting that “Justice Scalia is simply not an originalist” because “he
asserts a strong role for precedent, even where it is inconsistent with the original meaning of
the text.”); see also Scalia, supra note 72, at 861 (“Thus, almost every originalist would
adulterate [the original meaning of the text] with the doctrine of stare decisis - so that
Marbury v. Madison would stand even if Professor Raoul Berger should demonstrate
unassailably that it got the meaning of the Constitution wrong.”); Barnett comments: “Notice
that, contrary to [Scalia’s] professed skepticism about the legitimacy of judicial review, this
stance puts prior opinions of mere judges above that of the Constitution.” Barnett, supra note
90 at 12. Barnett also charges that Scalia effectively gave himself an exemption from
originalist results that he found unpalatable by postulating and utilizing three different
loopholes or avoidance mechanisms to get around such results. Id. at 13, 15.
93 554 U.S. 570, 576-77, 626-27 (2008).
94 Baude, supra note 88, at 2355.
95 Id. Scalia appears to have been an “inclusive” originalist, and this is probably why
Barnett regarded Clarence Thomas as the most “committed” originalist on the Court. But
see Lee J. Strang, The most Faithful Originalist?: Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and the
Future of Originalism, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 873, 874 (2011) (naming Justice Scalia as
the most consistent originalist).
96 Baude, supra note 88, at 2366-67.
97 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635-36.
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regulation of this right to strict scrutiny. 98 The rather ambiguous
Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” 99 Prior Supreme Court
Second Amendment case law had always viewed the right to bear
arms in the context of military defense, 100 as the prefatory clause
seems to imply, whereas the Heller decision untethered the right from
the prefatory clause.
A District of Columbia law banned the possession of
handguns in the home. 101 When special police officer Dick Heller
was denied a gun permit and later sued to challenge the law, the
federal district court dismissed his complaint, but the D.C. Circuit
reversed, 102 holding the D.C. law unconstitutional, and the Supreme
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. 103 Justice Scalia’s majority
decision, through a lengthy, scholarly marshaling of Eighteenth
Century sources and authorities, based its holding on originalism,104
and Justice Stevens’s dissent marshaled a comparable phalanx of
sources and authorities from the same period for the opposite
thesis. 105
The obscure character of the cases and other references, most
of them more than two centuries old, makes it extremely difficult for
an originalist reader not well-versed in the legal and historical
background of the Eighteenth Century to judge whether the Second
Amendment issue was correctly decided. Moreover, the Heller
opinion contains a major gap that appears to undercut its originalist
98 Id. at 628, 636. Justice Scalia was himself a gun enthusiast while growing up in
Queens. When he was a child, his grandfather, Antonino, took him rabbit hunting on Long
Island, and as a student at the Jesuit Xavier High School, in Manhattan, he was a member of
junior ROTC, engaged in target practice, and carried his rifle home on the subway.
BISKUPIC, supra note 4, at 19, 21-22.
99 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
100 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886).
101 Heller, 554 U.S. at 573.
102 Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
103 Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
104 Id. at 584, 600-01.
105 See Rory K. Little, Heller and Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism’s Last Gasp,
60 HASTINGS L.J. 1415, 1417-18, 1427 (2009) (critiquing both Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion and Justice Stevens’s dissent in Heller). Both opinions may be examples of “law
office history”, in which advocates for particular conclusions pick and choose from their
reading of history and select those practices which confirm the legal conclusions they want
to reach. Such an approach was criticized in Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit
Love Affair, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 119.
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claim to authoritativeness. While the decision affirms for the first
time since 1791 that there is a constitutional right to possess
handguns, at least for the purpose of defending one’s home, it
concludes with a cautionary note that
nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places
such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms. 106
The footnote to this important list of exceptions to the Heller
holding merely states without the slightest citation of support: “We
identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as
examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.” 107 However
sensible such exceptions may be as a matter of sound policy, it seems
that Scalia unevenly applied his originalist approach in omitting any
textual rationale or authority for concluding that such significant
exceptions to the Heller holding are valid. 108 In addition, the
decision does not even attempt to announce a standard for
adjudicating the constitutionality of future gun control laws, and thus
it imposed on lower courts in subsequent cases the fraught and
controversial task of establishing such standards. 109
Liberal proponents of gun control laws, appalled at the long
string of gun murders and massacres in recent years, might
understandably be troubled by Heller’s announcement of a new
Second Amendment right for individuals to possess firearms. 110
Criticism of Heller, however, was not limited to liberals; two eminent
conservative federal appellate judges, Richard Posner of the Seventh
Circuit and J. Harvie Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit, were also
among Scalia’s critics. 111
106

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
Id. at 627 n.26.
108 Id. at 692.
109 Id. at 719.
110 Dorothy Samuels, The Second Amendment was Never Meant to Protect an Individual’s
Right to a Gun, MOYERS & COMPANY (Dec. 4, 2015), http://billmoyers.com/story/thesecond-amendment-was-never-meant-to-protect-an-individuals-right-to-a-gun/.
111 Marc O. DeGirolami & Kevin C. Walsh, Judge Posner, Judge Wilkinson, and Judicial
Critique of Constitutional Theory, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633, 647 (2014).
107
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Justice Scalia had collaborated with Bryan Garner on a series
of books on originalism and legal writing. 112 In a rather negative
book review of one of these books, which he titled The Incoherence
of Antonin Scalia, 113 Posner argued that Scalia relied on legislative
history in violation of his originalist approach, which provoked Scalia
to call Posner a “liar.” 114 Posner later charged that the Obergefell
same sex marriage decision drove Scalia in dissent to espouse “an
extreme position concerning the role of the Supreme Court” 115 akin to
the status of the traditional British Constitution, where acts of
Parliament were ipso facto constitutional and could not be invalidated
by courts. 116 Posner stated that Scalia suggested that the Constitution
could not override the religious beliefs of many American citizens
who oppose same sex marriage, a view Posner called “radical.” 117
Judge Wilkinson, also a respected conservative, condemned
Roe v. Wade 118 as well as Heller in a book entitled Cosmic
Constitutional Theory. 119 Wilkinson argued that both decisions
involved “judicial value judgments based on thin and shaky
grounds.” 120 He condemned originalism as a form of “Activism
Masquerading as Restraint,” 121 which “fails to constrain judicial
choices” 122 when the historical evidence is ambiguous, as it is in
every hard case. The Roberts Court has not been reluctant to strike
down statutes as unconstitutional, and Judge Wilkinson obviously
adheres to traditional canons of judicial conservatism, in which courts
112

Posner, Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, supra note 18.
Posner, Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, supra note 18.
114 Corey Adwar, The Story of Why One of America’s Most Renowned Judges is Feuding
with Antonin Scalia, BUS. INSIDER: L. & ORD. (Jul. 2, 2014 1:37 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/judge-richard-posner-criticizes-antonin-scalia-2014-7.
115 Richard A. Posner & Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia’s Majoritarian Theocracy, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/opinion/justice-scaliasmajoritarian-theocracy.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Majoritarian Theocracy].
116 Thomas Poole, Constitutional Exceptionalism and the Common Law, 7 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 247, 269-70 (2009).
117 Posner & Segall, supra note 115.
118 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
119 J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 68 (2012); See also J.
Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV.
253 (2009). For a sharp rebuttal, especially of Wilkinson’s criticism of the Heller decision,
see Nelson Lund and David B. Kopel, Unraveling Judicial Restraint: Guns, Abortion, and
the Faux Conservatism of J. Harvie Wilkinson III, 25 J. L. & POL. 1 2009).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 33.
122 Id. at 46.
113
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should eschew policymaking and should instead show deference to
laws enacted by the elected representatives of the people. 123
Judge Wilkinson also criticized Bush v. Gore 124 as “no friend
of self-governance,” 125 mirroring the reported views of Justice David
Souter, who reportedly was upset by the decision, which cut short the
Florida Supreme Court’s review of the 2000 presidential election
returns. 126 Justice Scalia defended the Bush v. Gore decision on the
grounds that subsequent studies by various private groups had
concluded that Bush received the majority of votes in Florida, yet
Scalia disregarded other studies which reached the opposite
conclusion. 127 Scalia’s subsequent response to repeated questions
challenging Bush v. Gore, “[g]et over it,” was scarcely judicious or
persuasive in tone. 128
In any event, Scalia did not claim to be an originalist without
any exceptions; he called himself a “faint-hearted originalist” 129 and
cited as an example the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishments. 130 He noted that felons in the Eighteenth
Century were sometimes flogged and branded. While these were
accepted practices at the time he would never support them, despite
their originalist pedigree, if they were ever revived. 131

123 Id. at 68-69. See also Alan Gura, Heller and the Triumph of Originalist Judicial
Engagement: A Response to Judge Harvie Wilkinson, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1127 (2009). In this
article, Professor Alan Gura, a different kind of originalist, criticized Wilkinson’s support of
deference to current politicians and argued that the Heller decision faithfully adhered to
principles of textualism, originalism, federalism and respect for the separation of powers. Id.
at 1128.
124 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
125 WILKINSON, supra note 119, at 79.
126 The Associated Press, Souter Considered Resigning After Bush v. Gore, Book Says,
POLITICO (Sept. 7, 2007, 2:43 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2007/09/souterconsidered-resigning-after-bush-v-gore-book-says-005709.
127 Ford Fessenden & John M. Broder, Examining the Vote: The Overview; Study of
Disputed Florida Ballots Finds Justices Did Not Cast the Deciding Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
12,
2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/12/us/examining-vote-overview-studydisputed-florida-ballots-finds-justices-did-not.html; Ian Millhiser, Scalia Rewrites History,
Claims 5-4 Bush v. Gore Decision ‘Wasn’t Even Close’, THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 9, 2012),
https://thinkprogress.org/scalia-rewrites-history-claims-5-4-bush-v-gore-decision-wasnteven-close-50f73c6babe1.
128 Sheldon Nahmod, “Get Over It”: Justice Scalia and Bush v. Gore, Roe v. Wade and
Obergefell v. Hodges, IIT CHICAGO-KENT C. L.: SCOTUS NOW (Feb. 23, 2016),
http://blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/iscotus/get-over-it/.
129 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
130 Scalia, supra note 72, at 864.
131 Scalia, supra note 72, at 861, 864.
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While no doubt he was referring to more important
contemporary issues, influential originalist law professor Randy
Barnett criticized Justice Scalia for his “faint-heartedness.” 132 In
contrast, another law professor, Lee J. Strang, saluted Scalia as the
most faithful adherent of originalism. 133 This disagreement highlights
the broader, general disagreements within the originalist school of
jurisprudence. 134 Nevertheless, whatever may have been Justice
Scalia’s inconsistency as an avatar of originalism, the effect of his
Supreme Court opinions on American jurisprudence is undeniable
and is likely to prove lasting.
In contrast, the future of originalism as a jurisprudential
philosophy capable of yielding predictable concrete results when
applied to particular legal issues is cloudy and uncertain. It may be
easy to define originalism in crystal clear terms as an abstract theory,
but using the theory to resolve the novel legal issues which crop up in
new cases yields cloudy and inconsistent results.
In what is apparently the most detailed, in-depth study both of
articles by self-proclaimed academic originalists and the opinions of
Supreme Court justices who either profess or oppose originalism,
Frank B. Cross concluded that originalism had little predictive value
for the justices’ opinions:
The results [of Cross’s analyses] suggest that
originalism, at least as measured by use of originalist
sources, has failed to constrain the justices, not
because justices ignore it but instead because the
originalist sources can be employed for either a liberal
or a conservative result in the closely contested cases
before the Court. 135
Cross believes that people of opposing views will both inevitably find
support for their personal policy preferences in the originalist
materials, since
[t]he originalist record is obscure, circumstances and
legal controversies have changed greatly since the
132

Barnett, supra note 90, at 13-15.
Strang, supra note 95, at 874, 878-81.
134 Moreover, Scalia’s application of the originalist method plainly departed in important
respects from traditional conservative judicial values, such as deference to the legislative
branch and the presumption that legislation is constitutional. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson
exemplifies this more classic variety of judicial conservatism. See supra note 119.
135 CROSS, supra note 15, at 186.
133
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time of the founding, and the proper degree of
generalization of original language is highly
indeterminate. It should not be surprising that the
theory has little controlling legal power and that
advocates see in those materials what they want to
see. 136
Whatever originalism as a jurisprudential theory may hold for
the future of the Supreme Court, it is universally agreed that Justice
Scalia played a decisive role in shifting the Supreme Court to the
right during his tenure on the Court, and his embrace of originalism
was a critical part of his jurisprudential legacy. Democratic senators
charged that they were robbed of a Supreme Court choice to succeed
him because of Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s brazen
refusal even to meet with Judge Merrick Garland, President Obama’s
nominee. 137 Whatever the propriety of this move, it ensured that
Scalia’s legacy would be honored by his successor, Justice Neil
Gorsuch. 138 Justice Gorsuch, a devoted disciple of Scalia’s
jurisprudence and an active outdoorsman, learned of Scalia’s death
while skiing downhill in Colorado. 139 By his own account, he was so
overcome by grief that his eyes welled up with tears, and it was
difficult for him to make his way safely to the bottom of the hill. 140
136

Id. at 192-93.
Greg Milam, President Trump is to Name Choice of Supreme Court Justice, SKY NEWS
(Jan. 31, 2017, 8:41 PM), http://news.sky.com/story/president-trump-is-to-name-choice-ofsupreme-court-justice-10750430.
138 Richard Wolf, On Anniversary of Scalia’s Death, Will His Legacy Live on in Neil
Gorsuch?, USA TODAY (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
2017/02/13/supreme-court-neil-gorsuch-antonin-scalia-president-trump/97707654/. It seems
evident that the answer to this question is in the affirmative. A blog of the conservative
Heritage Foundation noted with satisfaction that in his “…first few cases, Gorsuch is
showing just how well he fits the Scalia mold of being a committed constitutionalist and
textualist on the High Court.” John Michael Seibler, In His First Criminal Cases, Neil
Gorsuch Already Mirroring Scalia, The Daily Signal, May 3, 2017. On his first day hearing
arguments on the Supreme Court, Justice Gorsuch manifested his commitment to textualism
when he asked an attorney, “Wouldn’t it be a lot easier if we just followed the plain text of
the statute?” Adam Liptak, Bitter Fight Behind Him, Justice Gorsuch Starts Day With
Relish, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2017, at A13.
139 Bill Mears, Analysis: Scalia Tribute May Have Boosted Gorsuch in Search for Court
Pick,FOX NEWS POL. (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/02/02/analysisscalia-tribute-may-have-boosted-gorsuch-in-search-for-court-pick.html.
137

140 On April 7, 2016, then Judge Gorsuch recalled this while delivering a lecture at Case Western
Reserve University School of Law, which was subsequently adapted and published in the school's law
review. Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of
Justice Scalia, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905 (2016) (endorsing Justice Scalia's textualist approach to
jurisprudence).
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